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Abstract: The work of the Afro-Martinican psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon is crucial 
to understanding the psychological and socio-political causes of disorder. Drawing upon his corpus, 
this article details the radical potential for disalienation located within his sociodiagnostic method 
and argues that personal and structural well-being can only be achieved together. This article will 
also both psychiatric and phenomenological models of depression as experienced by Africana 
people in order to better illuminate the usefulness of sociodiagnostics.  
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Resumo: O trabalho do psiquiatra e filósofo afro-martinicano Frantz Fanon é crucial para a 
compreensão das causas psicológicas e sociopolíticas da desordem. Com base em seu corpus, este 
artigo detalha o potencial radical de desalienação localizado em seu método sociodiagnóstico e 
argumenta que o bem-estar pessoal e estrutural só podem ser alcançados juntos. Este artigo também 
abordará modelos psiquiátricos e fenomenológicos de depressão vivenciados por africanos, a fim 
de esclarecer melhor a utilidade dos diagnósticos sociodiagnósticos. 
 






 There are branches of psychiatry that view psychological symptoms and causes as 
endogenous or not attributable to any external or environmental factor. Yet, if psychiatry is the 
branch of medicine focused on the proper diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of mental disorders 
then it must be attentive to the particular psychosocial factors that cause maladaptation, even if 
these causes lie outside the body. Fortunately, there are psychiatric branches that take seriously 
etiological factors that are exogenous and are thus typically categorized as psychosocial or 
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environmental stressors. For instance, in versions of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of 
Mental Disorder, such stressors include social environment problems, educational problems, 
occupational problems, housing problems, and economic problems. However, even these models 
fail to connect mental disorders to forms of structural oppression, such as antiblack racism. 
Moreover, they do not provide a systematic analysis of how alleviating such societal problems 
might be integral to the treatment of mental illness. 
The work of the Afro-Martinican psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon is here a 
worthy antidote insofar as he was not only opposed to these dehumanizing and alienated forms of 
psychiatry, but also offered a situational diagnosis of alienation. In analyzing the brutalities of the 
colonial situation, Fanon aimed to not only accurately diagnose such an unhealthy environment, he 
also urged his patients to become actional and change the colonial order of Algeria. This 
psychology methodology, called “sociodiagnostics,” reveals how racism and colonialism function 
as socio-etiological causes of disease requiring both patients and mental health practitioners to 
restructure the disordered socio-political arrangements that make such conditions possible. 
 
1.The derelict method 
  
 Sociodiagnostics as a psychiatric methodology not only accounts for socio-etiological 
causes and the lived-experience of alienation, but also more importantly offers treatment beyond 
the psyche. In this respect, sociodiagnostics begins from the premise that one’s psyche is intimately 
connected with the environment and therefore both the diagnosis and treatment of disorder 
necessarily deals with restructuring unhealthy social conditions. As the literary critic Frederic 
Jameson argues, “When a psychic structure is objectively determined by economic and political 
relationships, it cannot be dealt with by means of purely psychological therapies; yet it equally 
cannot be dealt with by means of purely objective transformations of the economic and political 
situation itself, since the habits remain and exercise a baleful and crippling residual effect” 
(JAMESON, 1986, p. 76). In terms of diagnosis, sociodiagnostics provides clarifications that can 
account for general symptoms of Africana subjects, within socio-cultural situations, as well as the 
personal idiosyncratic experiences of depression.  
Fanon was one of the foremost pioneers of sociodiagnostics in his studies and treatment of 
colonial psychopathology. Working at the Blida-Joinville psychiatric hospital in Algeria, Fanon 




found himself treating both perpetrators and victims of colonial violence. As Paul Adams writes, 
“During 1954 and 1955, and into 1956, he functioned as a double agent while earning his living at 
that post. He was officially and publicly a psychiatrist for the French colonial establishment, but 
underground he became ever more deeply involved in the anticolonial struggled led by the Algerian 
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)” (ADAMS, 1970, p. 810).  The anticolonial activities that 
Fanon found himself enacting were not, however, simply political acts. They can also be read as a 
continuation of his psychiatric method. Thus, when Fanon resigned from his post at Blida-Joinville 
to work openly with the FLN it was done in the name of enacting or creating the possibility of a 
healthy environment in Algeria. As Fanon argues, “my objective, once [the patient’s] motivations 
have been brought into consciousness, will be to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) 
with respect to the real source of the conflict—that is, toward the social structures” (FANON, 1986, 
p. 75). In other words, if racism and colonialism provoke mental disorders, treatment must also be 
directed externally to the environment.  
Fanonian sociodiagnostics is thus rooted in understanding the sociogenic causes of mental 
disorders. Rather than simply being a personal (phylogenic) or universally applicable (ontogenic) 
disorder, situational disorders detail the particular social conditions that adversely affect mental 
health. For instance, in “The ‘North African Syndrome,’” Fanon argues that French medical 
practitioners in having an a priori attitude failed in the diagnosing and treating of the North African 
immigrant population. A pre-existing, racist framework and a commitment to the colonial project 
result in the solidification of a colonial ethnopsychiatry. Opposed to these dehumanizing and 
alienated forms of psychiatry, Fanon offered a situational diagnosis of colonialism. It is for this 
reason that Fanon, quoting Erich Stern states, “One must try to find out what [Heinrich] Meng calls 
his ‘situation’: that is to say, his relations with his associates, his occupations and his 
preoccupations, his sexuality, his sense of security or of insecurity, the dangers that threaten him; 
and we may add also his evolution, the story of his life. One must make a ‘situational diagnosis’” 
(FANON, 1967, p. 10). In enacting a “situational diagnosis” or sociodiagnostic of the African 
diaspora, one thereby not only accounts for the lived-experience of Africana members, but also 
reveals the exogenous causes of mental disorders.  
It is thus important to note that sociodiagnostics is also informed by Africana 
phenomenological practices. The best evidence of phenomenology playing a role in Fanon’s 
psychiatric practice is his use of phenomenological suspension, or epoché. This is a practice where 




non-evident matters or assumptions are suspended so that information can be seen in a different 
light. For instance, in “Social therapy in a ward of Muslim men: Methodological difficulties,” 
Fanon and Jacques Azoulay ask, “How was a structural analysis possible if the geographical, 
historical, cultural and social frameworks were placed in parentheses” (FANON, 2018, p. 362). 
This question highlights how both men sought to bring socio-historical causes into the psychiatric 
framework through suspending a priori commitments to non-situational models. Unfortunately, 
there has been a neglect of phenomenology in contemporary psychiatry because it does not meet 
the criteria of scientific objectivity. As Sean Baumann argues:  
 
In current practice there appears to be a gulf between diagnostic explanations and a 
sufficient understanding of the predicament of the individual in a specific personal and 
social context…. Diagnostic explanations and meaningful understanding should not be 
considered dichotomous, but standard clinical practice and research programmes seem to 
disregard the need to integrate the two perspectives (BAUMANN, 2010, p. 114).  
 
However, as argued previously, Africana phenomenology adds to the understanding of both 
to the lived-experience of blackness and depression. One cannot understand the socio-etiological 
causes of depression without first considering personal and situational contexts. Moreover, 
phenomenological techniques and concerns are not in themselves absent from forms of counseling 
or social models of depression. For instance, in the social model of depression, the environment 
plays an instructive role in provoking mental disorders. As Suman Fernando argues, “Treatment 
within this [social] model is to encourage strategies for self assertion and control over events—not 
a ‘coming to terms’ or changing cognitive sets: Identifying racism as the restrictive yoke which 
prevents patients from controlling their environment lead to ways of encouraging resistance and 
self assertion” (FERNANDO, 1984, p. 46). 
Sociodiagnostics advocates for environmental restructuring because it has identified the 
socio-etiological causes of disease. Identifying racism as not simply an environmental stressor, but 
part of the psychosocial structure of Africana being allows for a clearer understanding of alienation. 
As Fanon argued previously with regards to the North African Syndrome, “Threatened in his 
affectivity, threatened in his social activity, threatened in his membership in the community-the 
North African combines all the conditions that make a sick man” (FANON, 1967, p. 13).  
Given the significance the environment plays on mental well-being and disorder, one must 
note that structural change is a crucial component of sociodiagnostics. In analyzing the brutalities 




of the colonial situation, Fanon aimed to not only accurately diagnose such an unhealthy 
environment, he also urged his patients to become actional and change their environment. 
However, as the community psychologist Derek Hook argues, “…the more people internalize 
oppression through various psychological mechanisms, the less they will see their suffering as 
resulting from unjust political conditions. At times, the internalized psychological oppression will 
almost completely obscure the political roots and dynamics of oppression” (HOOK, 2004, p. 128). 
In analyzing alienation, it thus becomes necessary to account for the acknowledgements and denials 
of those affected by both mental and political disorder. Thus, Fanon argues that: “Although I had 
more or less concentrated on the psychic alienation of the black man, I could not remain silent 
about certain things which, however psychological they may be, produce consequences that extend 
into the domains of other sciences” (FANON, 1986, p. 34). In order to understand the lived-
experiences of antiblack racism and colonialism on the black subject, Fanon had to not only account 
for prevailing prejudices, but also account for associated environmental and socio-political 
dysfunction. Moreover, it became necessary to motivate individuals to restructure their 
environment. For Nigel Gibson and Roberto Beneduce this meant that “Fanon aimed not only to 
provide an analysis but in medical terms a ‘lysis’— a destruction of this ‘morbid universe’ with its 
‘psycho-existential complex’ and brutal social and economic realities” (GIBSON; BENEDUCE, 
2017, p. 73). In applying sociodiagnostics to the lived-experiences of blacks, it then becomes 
important to detail the ways a lysis would be applied to black alienation.  
 Last, it is important to note that sociodiagnostics is a transdisciplinary psychiatric method. 
To diagnosis and treat depression for Africana subjects, one cannot simply rely on interdisciplinary 
or multicultural efforts. Multicultural training within psychiatry, whether through the study of racist 
attitudes, racial discrimination, microaggression, or race-based trauma, too often fails to account 
for the non-psychiatric methods of treating depression. As the Africana philosopher Lewis Gordon 
argues, “[A] teleological suspension of disciplinarity suggests a transdisciplinary movement, 
where engagement with reality may demand disciplinary adjustment, transcendence, or the 
construction of new disciplines. Teleological suspension demands being willing to go beyond one’s 
disciplinary presuppositions for the sake of reality” (GORDON, 2010, p. 203). If environmental 
dysfunction is a cause of alienation, or exasperates its symptoms, then it is necessary to move 
beyond the discipline. Sociodiagnostics moves beyond psychiatry in arguing for socio-political 
action and environmental restructuring as conditions for well-being. Moreover, it is through 




sociodiagnostics that one can then combat experiencing mental disorders as dysbeing. As Fanon 
wrote, “Hence we are driven from the individual back to the social structure. If there is a taint, it 





It is within tainted environments, or “disordered” socio-political arrangements structured 
by antiblack racism and colonialism, that alienation flourishes. For Fanon, both whites and la nègre 
(a French term meaning both “Negro” and “nigger”) are affected by alienation. In the former, this 
alienation is caused by being enslaved to a superiority complex. In the latter, alienation is due to 
being enslaved by an inferiority complex. Fanon even states that Black Skins, White Masks 
represents the culmination of his seven years of psychiatric observations with regards to these types 
of alienation. However, what interests me here is black alienation. Fanon writes that, “In the man 
of color there is a constant effort to run away from his own individuality, to annihilate his own 
presence. Whenever a man of color protests, there is alienation. Whenever a man of color rebukes, 
there is alienation” (FANON, 1986, p. 42-3). 
The most extreme cases of black alienation are those that internalize the disorder present 
within socio-political arrangements that are conditioned by racism and coloniality. With regards to 
black alienation, inferiority itself becomes ontological. Fanon argues that “We must see whether it 
is possible for the black man to overcome his feeling of insignificance, to rid his life of the 
compulsive quality that makes it so like the behavior of the phobic. Affect is exacerbated in the 
Negro, he is full of rage because he feels small, he suffers from an inadequacy in all human 
communication, and all these factors chain him with an unbearable insularity” (FANON, 1986, p. 
35). One’s presumed nonbeing and subordinate social location become confirmation of one’s “bad” 
being, or pathological existence. In other words, instead of being beset by abnormal conditions, 
one becomes pathological or inferior. Black alienation, or dysbeing (bad being), thus is a more 
general symptom affecting the lives of Africana people due to the intertwining of medical, social 
and political orders. Influenced by the work of the Jamaican cultural theorist Sylvia Wynter, 
“dysbeing” tracks the symptomatic forms of alienation and pathology that results simply from 
being-black-in-the-world. As Wynter argues:  





The systemic inducing of black self-alienation, together with the securing of the 
correlated powerlessness of its African-descended population group at all levels of 
our contemporary global order or system-ensemble...[is premised on] our present 
sociogenic code or genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable 
wrongness of being,’ of désêtre, which it imposes upon all black peoples and, to a 
somewhat lesser degree, on all white peoples (WYNTER, 2005, p. 118).  
 
This “unbearable wrongness of being” is instituted through the systematic devaluing and 
dehumanization of Africana people. Insofar as slavery, colonialism, and racialized stereotyping 
have historically mapped on to black populations so too does “dysbeing” then seek to map the 
causes of these situations in the individual and group pathologies of Africana people. This global 
order thus re-situates socio-political projects and their adverse effects as being inherent defects of 
a people. In this way, Africana people are transformed from human beings facing problems into 
“bad” beings.   
Black people afflicted with mental disorders are doubly burdened insofar as there is no 
acknowledgement of societal dysfunction exacerbating their symptoms or being the cause of their 
mental illness. Moreover, because such individuals do not adequately function in such unhealthy 
societies, mental disorders become markers of individual failing. However, by acknowledging that 
some of the dysfunction produced by antiblack racism and coloniality can deeply affect a subject’s 
well-being, one can see how the problems faced by Africana people is recognizable as mental 
disorders. Moreover, the black individual’s affective reactions to racism and racist environs are not 
only evident as psychiatric disorders, but is also present in interactions with psychologists and 
doctors. In other words, in a racist society, Africana people are situated as an object of diagnosis. 
As such, dysbeing engenders an anguished relationship to a world in which one has to live as “that-
which-shall-be-diagnosed.” 
To be diagnosed or branded with a label of mental disorder even if one’s individual actions 
are a direct or indirect response to the socio-political disorder affecting oneself is to face dysbeing. 
For Africana people can begin to internalize their mental disorder as something disorderly or 
pathological about their own functioning. For instance, “black melancholia” is a special case of 
dysbeing. Lewis Gordon also argues that:  
 
Euromodernity produced a special form of alienation through the transformation 
of whole groups of people into categories of “indigenous,” “native,” “enslaved,” 




“colonized,” and “black.” Such people suffer a unique form of melancholia 
(bereavement from separation), as they are indigenous to a world that rejects them 
by virtue of making them into problems. Their “home” is, unfortunately, a 
homeless one…. The African, in other words, struggles paradoxically, as do the 
African Diaspora, with being homeless at home (GORDON, Unpublished, p. 6).  
 
As long as Africana people continue to live in a world predicated on antiblackness, they 
will continue to see the economic, political, and psychosocial problems they face be turned instead 
to evidence of their “bad” being. Such a form of melancholia is typical across the Afro-diaspora. 
However, this alienation is also seen within mood disorders. Sociodiagnostics thus allows one to 
examine the relationship between mood disorders and dysbeing for Africana people, while also 
being able to offer situational treatments. One way of thus seeing the radical possibilities of 
sociodiagnostics is examining how depression is experienced for Africana people that live in 
deranged and “disordered” socio-political arrangements. 
 
3. A case of depression 
 
 Depression is conventionally understood as a mood disorder that causes persistent and 
severe feelings of despondency and loss of interest in previously rewarding or enjoyable activities. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), a diagnosis of 
Major Depressive Disorder must consist of either depressed mood or disinterestedness along with 
five (or more) additional symptoms, such as significant weight loss or weight gain, insomnia or 
hypersomnia, daily agitation or fatigue, diminished ability to think, excessive feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt, as well as recurrent suicidal ideation (APA, 2013, p. 30-31). These 
symptoms often present themselves as a persistent dysphoria that is not attached to any specific 
thought or preoccupations. This psychiatric diagnostic of depression, however, makes no mention 
of any psychosocial etiologies but rather relies on the discovery and discernment of distinct 
symptoms. It is true that the former Axis IV conditions of the DSM-IV dealt with a more holistic 
picture of illness rather than dealing with acute symptomology.2 For instance, it focused on 
“…reporting psychosocial and environmental stressors that may affect the diagnosis, treatment, 
 
2 It must be noted that the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) has 
abandoned the multiaxial system (present in DSM-IV-TR) in order to eliminate the confusing distinctions between 
Axis I: Clinical Disorders, Axis II: Personality Disorders, and Axis III: Medical or Physical Conditions. Clinicians still 
evaluate psychosocial and environmental stressors, however, they do so without Axis IV.  




and prognosis of mental disorders” (APA, 2000, p. 31). The categories the DSM highlighted are 
primary support group problems, social environment problems, educational problems, 
occupational problems, housing problems, economic problems, problems with access to health care 
services, and problems related to interaction with the legal system/crime. However, even this 
holistic approach to psychological health operates with an assumption that systemic disruptions do 
not fully account for socio-political disarrangements. Although, these factors might exacerbate 
psychological problems neither the DSM-V nor DSM-IV (Axis IV) connect such problems with 
forms of oppression, such as antiblack racism, nor do they provide a systematic analysis of how 
alleviating such problems might be integral to the treatment of mental illness. 
 With that being said, depression in both these manuals is characterized as a psychological 
disorder based on a symptomatic or minimal interpretation of mental illness. Under a minimal 
interpretation of mental health, disease is not a pathological process of the bodily system, but rather 
focuses on the perceivable characteristics, or symptoms, of mental disorders. Since the DSM model 
is based on a minimal interpretation, it is an appropriate point to begin with criticisms regarding 
the popular psychiatric notion of depression. According to Dominic Murphy:  
 
A minimal interpretation makes no commitments about the underlying physical 
structure that causes mental illness…. Minimalists treat diagnostic labels as 
useful heuristics rather than natural kind terms, whereas a strong interpretation 
commits psychiatry to a view of mental illness as a medical disease in the 
strongest sense, that of a pathogenic process unfolding in bodily systems 
(MURPHY, 2017, p. ? ). 
 
The current DSM-V thus treats the cluster of heterogeneous symptoms presented earlier as useful 
criteria for diagnosing Major Depressive Disorder. However, even though this view is not 
committed to mental illnesses being caused by “morbid anatomy” it remains non-situational by 
eschewing the cultural and socio-political causes of depression. Under a minimalist reading, 
depression is thus best understood through essential features or after-effects, namely outward signs 
of dysfunction. As Murphy argues, “The DSM concept of depression, on the face of it, lumps 
together different psychological and behavioral types in the same category. It does this because it 
neglects the diverse etiologies that may produce similar signs and symptoms” (MURPHY, 2017). 
By contrast, Africana phenomenology, in focusing on the lived-experience of Africana people, 
becomes an orientation that can lead to a fuller exploration of the full range of contributing 




mechanisms that produce depression in Africana people, such as by revealing etiological causes 
that are socio-politically produced but that also produce similar signs and symptoms, as recorded 
in the DSM.   
 While recognizing the same outward effects delineated by the DSM, Africana 
phenomenology offers a political understanding of mental health in contradistinction to the 
apolitical diagnostics of the DSM. Under the “disordered” socio-political arrangement of an 
antiblack world, it is these same socio-political causes that result in mood disorders, including 
Africana depression. In order to understand the implications of such a view it is first necessary to 
make an Africana phenomenological examination of the body, consciousness, and “world” of 
Africana people. It will then become apparent that Africana depression not only has strong 
exogenous causes, but that it shifts or de-situates a black individual’s orientation to an antiblack 
“world” due to one being conscious of one’s alienation from the conditions of possibility and 
futurity. This alienation is due in part to a “historico-racial” schema that reduces, or rather over-
determines, the humanity and agency of black people to their body. Moreover, I will argue that 
being conscious of this situation can result in depression. A foreclosed reality becomes part and 
parcel of mundane lived-experience in such a manner that it becomes internalized as “dysbeing.”  
 Given the strong psychosocial connections between mental health and one’s environment 
it is perhaps best to return to psychiatric definitions of depression within the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Major depressive disorder consists of either depressed 
mood or disinterestedness along with five (or more) additional symptoms, such as significant 
weight loss or weight gain, insomnia or hypersomnia, daily agitation or fatigue, diminished ability 
to think, excessive feelings of worthlessness or guilt, as well as recurrent suicidal ideation. What 
would it mean for a diagnosis of depression to treat psychosocial stressors as an integral component 
of the mood disorder? What if diagnosticians and practitioners moved beyond the psychosocial 
account provided by Axis IV in the DSM-IV-TR? One possibility is hinted at in a study by Gilman 
and colleagues that argues that Axis IV—the incorporation of psychosocial and environmental 
stressors into the prognosis of psychiatric disorders—should be enhanced due to its prognostic 
value:  
 
There exists a substantial evidence base to support the development of a more 
sophisticated Axis IV, one which would go beyond the simple presence or absence 
of events and incorporate both the nature of the stressors and context in which they 




occur. This might include distinguishing chronic from acute stressors, and 
identifying stressors that impact an individual’s core identity or that individuals 
appraise as highly disruptive (GILMAN et al, 2013, p. 312).  
 
Here it must be noted that the event-based configuration of Axis IV and the psychosocial 
and environmental problems assessed by Gilman and colleagues do provide some limitations. In 
examining fourteen factors—the death of someone intimate, serious illness, relationship failure, 
financial hardship or precarity, interpersonal conflict, police interaction, incarceration, etc.—
Gilman and colleagues do not analyze structural issues impacting the lives of their participants. For 
our purposes, this is a critical lapse because in order to understand Africana—and perhaps 
ultimately all forms of—depression one has to see how psychosocial stressors such as institutions 
of structural degradation are intimately connected with antiblack racism. Given the heterogeneity 
of Africana experiences, the impact of psychosocial stressors is also variegated. However, since 
psychosocial stressors can be highly protracted and disruptive (such as with racialized violence), 
then perhaps stressor is not the correct word. For if antiblackness is a structure and not an event, 
then psychosocial “stressors” do not only initiate and/or exacerbate mental disorder they can also 
be seen as part of the racialized affects and experiences particular to Africana subjects. In this way, 
rather than being simply a psychosocial stressor, antiblackness can actually serve as a psychosocial 
structure of the lived-experiences of Africana people.  
 How then to understand this psychosocial structure? I have argued elsewhere that this 
structure can be understood through the concept of situatedness (Befindlichkeit). In particular, I 
have argued that, “De-situatedness…captures the ground of experience for Africana people in 
antiblack environments” (MIRANDA, 2018). Turning to the works of Matthew Ratcliffe and 
Anthony Vincent Fernandez will here be helpful insofar as both thinkers employ phenomenology 
to understand depression as being intimately connected with de-situatedness. For Ratcliffe, 
depression is a fundamental shift in mood. As such, his positive account argues that depression is 
the result of a degraded shift in mood (Stimmung) with consequences for one’s situatedness 
(Befindlichkeit). Both Ratcliffe and Fernandez illuminate the connection between depression and 
situatedness by drawing on ideas from Martin Heidegger. With regard to situatedness, Fernandez 
states:  
 
Befindlichkeit is, for Heidegger, an essential structure of human existence. That is 
to say, being always already situated in the world is a fundamental, categorical 




characteristic of human existence. This situatedness, however, is always manifest 
through some Stimmung, some mood or other. Situatedness, then, can be 
understood as the category (existential) that includes any and all moods, or 
particular ways of being attuned…. [Each mood] plays the role of situating us in 
the world. In light of this, it is situatedness in general that makes up an ontological 
structure of human existence (FERNANDEZ, 2014, p. 600-1). 
 
In this respect, both Ratcliffe’s and Fernandez’s account relies on a pre-given sense of the “world,” 
since all human individuals are situated within a world. However, how one experiences one’s 
situatedness in the world is dependent upon one’s particular mood or capacity to feel moods. For 
Ratcliffe, depression is not a situating mood. Instead, it is experienced as an erosion of moods. For 
instance, in depression, feelings of happiness, joy and sadness are instead transformed into 
indistinct blobs incapable of eliciting their previous pull of excitation. This incapacity or degraded 
capacity to experience moods fundamentally affects one’s relationship to the world. As Ratcliffe 
states:  
 
[T]he “world,” in this sense, is not an explicit object of experience or thought but 
something we already “find ourselves in,” something that all our experiences, 
thoughts and activities take for granted…. [However, this] ordinarily pre-reflective 
sense of “belonging to a shared world”…is altered in depression…[since it] 
involves a change in the kinds of possibility that are experienced as integral to the 
world and, with it, a change in the structure of one’s overall relationship with the 
world (RATCLIFFE, 2015, p. 2).  
 
Depression thus involves the fundamental disturbance of what we can experience in ways that are 
“seldom reflected upon and poorly understood” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 10). For Ratcliffe, it is 
misleading to characterize depression as sadness or melancholy—as these are themselves just 
general moods that color our sense of situatedness. Depression is rather the erosion of mood itself 
and with it our ability to sense that we belong to a shared world. However, this ordinary sense of 
“belonging to the world” is not apparent for Africana people.  
 Take for instance the fact that many Africana people have no sense of their being able to 
bring about significant changes to an antiblack world, then their mood can erode. In this case, not 
only is there an erosion of mood there is also an exaggerated sense of one’s lack. In an environment 
that constantly degrades and dehumanizes one such alienation can all too easily lead to depression. 
In speaking of the loss of hope experienced in depression, Ratcliffe states, “Insofar as something 
is pointless and also inevitable, passive hope is equally unsustainable. Where something is 




inevitable, nobody can act so as to avoid it; alternative possibilities are absent…. The future is 
there, but it offers nothing of the kind that would allow one to form hopes” (RATCLIFFE, 2015, 
p. 112-13). When the future or the world is seen as inevitably meaningless and with no significant 
possibility, then there is almost a doomed certainty that only bad happens. However, this existential 
erosion of hope is not only experienced in Africana depression, it has the added effect of being an 
actual project of an antiblack world. This type of socio-political disarrangement constantly seeks 
to produce futures that are hopeless for black people. In this sense, de-situatedness is the ordinary 
form of situatedness (Befindlichkeit) for Africana people.  
Moreover, if one takes a look at the Heideggerian conception, which influence both 
Ratcliffe and Fernandez above, depression seems to function as a ground mood. Ground moods in 
Heidegger’s work are also known as fundamental attunements: “Attunements are the fundamental 
ways in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Attunements are the ‘how’ [Wie] 
according to which one is in such and such a way” (HEIDEGGER, 2001, p. 67). As such, ground 
moods are ontologically revelatory. For the de-situated Africana subject, could one then not say 
that depression is one of the main or fundamental attunements in finding oneself living an antiblack 
world?  
Here it is perhaps best to look at Heidegger’s examination of anxiety in Being and Time 
due to the centrality of anxiety undertaken in the book. As Fernandez argues, “Anxiety falls into 
Heidegger’s category of ground moods [Grundstimmungen]. These moods are foundational, 
disclosing the world in such a way that they both open and constrain the possible range of meaning, 
significance, and feelings that can manifest within the world” (FERNANDEZ, 2014, p. 598). As 
such, attunements are not mere emotional events or states but rather ways of being that disclose 
one’s being-in-the-world. In other words, anxiety detaches one from an ordinary sense of belonging 
such that one experiences one’s life as indeterminate and without coordinates. It is for this reason 
that Heidegger argues that, “In anxiety one feels ‘uncanny.’ Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that 
which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the ‘nothing and 
nowhere.’ But here ‘uncanniness’ also means ‘not-being-at-home’ [das zuhause-sein]” 
(HEIDEGGER, 2008, p. 233).  
Heideggerian anxiety is in some ways uncannily similar to de-situatedness. For instance, 
when thinking of depression one can easily think of the statement by Lewis Gordon that “black 
melancholia…is the condition of being rejected by the world to which black people are indigenous 




(Euromodernity)” (GORDON, 2017). This not-being-at-home is particularly relevant for Africana 
people. Moreover, it would seem appropriate to categorize depression as a fundamental attunement 
for Africana subjects given the preponderance of de-situatedness. However, if depression were 
defined phenomenologically as the experience of de-situatedness from the world, would it not then 
hold that all black people are depressed most, if not all, of the time? In other words, if one were to 
use this phenomenological approach to diagnose depression, would not all Africana people be 
depressed? If that is not the case, we need a different, or at least additional, set of diagnostics that 
have a different relationship to existential experience and feelings about the world.  
In an earlier work, Ratcliffe argued that depression and Heideggerian anxiety have many 
similarities: “Severe depression can involve a radical transformation of the ordinarily taken-for-
granted sense of belonging to a world, where the usual sense of things as practically significant is 
gone from experience. In addition, both depression and Heideggerian anxiety involve not only a 
loss of possibilities but also a conspicuous awareness that something has been lost” (RATCLIFFE, 
2013, p. 172). Under this account, depression is a ground mood because it radically discloses and 
forecloses a sense of belonging and possibility for an individual.   
However, what is distinctive about Ratcliffe’s later phenomenological account of 
depression is its ability to incapacitate. Depression is fundamentally defined by the eroded capacity 
to feel moods. Thus, if depression is not identical with Heideggerian anxiety, even though they 
share many similarities, how do we rethink Africana depression beyond its etiological causes? One 
must begin to perceive how depression, as an eroded capacity to feel moods, is connected to de-
situatedness, an eroded sense of belonging, within Africana experience.  
At the same time, this connection reveals that de-situatedness is not fundamentally 
determining even as it remains a pre-reflective structure of experience or psychosocial structure. 
Rather de-situatedness and eroded moods are coterminous but neither synonymous nor equivalent. 
As mentioned previously, Ratcliffe argues that depression erodes one’s capacity to feel moods 
thereby altering one’s sense of belonging, whereas Fernandez argues that depression alters one’s 
state of situatedness thereby eroding one’s capacity to feel moods. Both theories fail to account for 
the structural de-situatedness that marks the “everyday experience” of Africana subjects. For 
Ratcliffe, this failure to account for structural de-situatedness result in an inability to see how 
Africana de-situatedness is an achievement of an antiblack world and not simply the result of 
eroded moods. For Fernandez, this results in a misreading of de-situatedness as being equivalent 




with depression. Thus, when Fernandez states, “Many people diagnosed with depression are, in a 
sense, de-situated” he fails to recognize that many Afro-diasporic people who are de-situated are 
not depressed (FERNANDEZ, 2014, p. 605). This means that even de-situatedness can cultivate a 
range of responses within individuals to depressing circumstances. It is perhaps best then to see de-
situatedness then as a “first cause,” following the work of Nassir Ghaemi.  
A “first cause” reflects an underlying structure, such as genetics or early life environment, 
which makes one susceptible to depression, whereas an “efficient cause” describes a triggering 
event, such as those detailed by Axis IV of the DSM-IV. Here it is necessary to quote Ghaemi at 
length. He argues: 
 
The first cause is necessary for later depression though not sufficient; it usually is 
not enough to lead to the actual depressive episodes of adult life. The efficient 
causes are not necessary—depression can occur without them, and the same life 
events occur without depression in other people, and even in the same person they 
do not invariably produce depression—but they sometimes are sufficient: in some 
persons they can lead to depression whenever they occur. So first causes are 
necessary but usually not sufficient; efficient causes are often sufficient but not 
necessary. One usually needs both, and neither alone is the cause of depression 
(GHAEMI, 2013, p. 16)).   
 
Here I would argue that de-situatedness, cultivated by antiblackness and coloniality, 
remains a “first cause” of depression. Racialized violence, as well as other psychosocial stressors, 
are “efficient causes” of depressive episodes. As Ghaemi would argue, it is a common, but tragic 
mistake to see efficient causes as the cause of depression. Rather it is only when the two are taken 
together that one gets an accurate picture of Africana depression. For instance, an Africana subject 
who constantly experiences slurs and microaggressions may live in an environment that is 
thoroughly inflected by disorder. It is through this lived-experience of racism within an antiblack 
world that transforms one’s capacity into an inability to experience moods. This transformation is, 
however, manifested uniquely by an individual. As Fanon argues, “The neurotic structure of the 
individual is simply the elaboration, the formation, the eruption within the ego, of conflictual 
clusters arising in part out of the environment and in part out of the purely personal way in which 
the individual reacts to these influences” (FANON, 1986, p. 81). De-situatedness although 
necessary, insofar as it acts as a psychosocial structure, is not sufficient. This is due in part, because 
an individual is confronted by discrete experiences that are distinct and non-identical to others. To 




that end, my model of structural de-situatedness is always cognizant of the unique, existential 
choices that Africana people face by the ever-present possibility of depression.  
In this sense, one can understand Africana depression as operative through the psychosocial 
structure of de-situatedness. The de-situated subject experiences non-belonging in the world, but 
this does not automatically translate into periods of dysfunction or mood erosions. A depressed 
subject might enact performances to regain a sense of belonging and normality. Or a subject may 
still vigorously try to collapse the disorder present in socio-political orders so that depression is 
only recognizable as a personal dysfunction. Moreover, some depressed subjects may still 
experience an erosion of moods, while maintaining a healthier metastable relationship to their 
mood disorder. This then is the radicality of Africana depression. Not all forms of depression are 
indicative of dysfunction or mental illness: “Illness situates the patient in a world in which his or 
her freedom, will and desires are constantly broken by obsessions, inhibitions, countermands, 
anxieties” (FANON, 2018, p. 497). Africana depression, insofar as it tied to black alienation and 





Thus, by utilizing sociodiagnostics, one is able to not only trace the socio-etiological causes 
of depression, but is also able to understand the triadic connection between black alienation, social 
structures, and the mental state of Africana people. At the same time, Fanon was also immensely 
concerned with disalienation. In fact, Black Skin, White Masks was originally titled “An Essay for 
the Disalienation of Blacks.” For Fanon, disalienation was also necessarily a process of reanimation 
insofar as it consisted precisely in assisting colonized people to become actional, while also 
restructuring society. The psychiatrist’s job is thus twofold. Recovery or “repossession” is only 
accomplished once Africana people are capable of social participation and transforming the 
material and cultural conditions of their world: “There will be an authentic disalienation only to 
the degree to which things, in the most materialistic meaning of the word, will have been restored 
to their proper places” (FANON, 1986, p. 11-12). Fanon demands the reordering of society, not 
only because this goes directly against the mandates of colonial psychiatry, but also because 
wellness cannot be achieved in a dysfunctional environment. This is why this reordering can never 




be confused with adapting patients to an ill society. Fanon does not demand for re-socialization 
even when, “Society asks the psychiatrist to render the patient able again to reintegrate into society” 
(FANON, 2018, p. 517). For if the psychiatrist aims to reintegrate colonized people to colonial 
orders this would simply amount to further acculturation to a racist society. To understand the 
colonial world, the antiblack world, or the modern world requires that psychiatrist perceive the vast 
derangement and unfreedom undergirding such structures. Without this perception, psychiatrists 
further fail to treat mental disorders. The dysfunction that must be treated is not only of the patient, 
but also of the world. Fanonian sociodiagnostics is thus a psychiatric model for past, present and 
future times.  
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